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on the ground that unavoidable accident or sudden emergency had not
been shown, but that the damage had resulted from negligence. However, the words of the court in the earlier case were, "There was no
evidence to show that the tree was felled by design or carelessness."
In fact, the trial court had charged that intent or carelessness in felling
the tree would have to be shown; and for this error in the charge, the
defendant's judgment below was reversed. The conclusion seems
and non-negligent
inescapable that both cases involved unintentional
5
entry, yet different results were reached.
However, the present position of the court, taken in Smith v. Pate,
brings North Carolina in accord with what purports to be the weight
of authority on this point.6
WILTON RANKIN
Trade Regulation-State Fair Trade Acts-Trading Stamps
Fair trade laws, enacted in all states except Missouri, Texas, and
Vermont,' permit vertical price fixing 2 contracts between a manufacturer
and a wholesaler or a retailer which establish a fixed resale price of
the manufacturer's product. The acts provide that as soon as one such
contract is entered into with a distributor within a state, all other
distributors on the same level of competition who receive notice of the
contract are bound by it, even though they are non-signers. 3
For the purpose of preventing evasion of the resale price maintenance
contracts, twenty states and territories 4 have specifically prohibited
For an example of another state recently changing from the early common
law to the modem trend, compare Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W.
739 (1914); Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Stevens, 223 Ky. 192, 3 S.W.2d 203 (1927)
with Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955); Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d
559 (Ky. 1956).
"Except where the actor is engaged in
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934).
an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in
the possession of another, or causing a thing or third person to enter the land,
does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even though the entry
causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person in whose security the
third person has a legally protected interest."
This Note is not concerned with trespass to person, but it should be pointed
out that unavoidable accident is also a defense to trespass to person. REsTATEMENT,
TORTS §§ 18, 21, 35 (1934).
1 A complete compilation of fair trade laws may be found in 2 CCH TRADE
RBG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 10000-15585 (1956).
2 Both horizontal and vertical price fixing were originally prohibited by the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. IV 1957),
but vertical price fixing was later exempted from the Sherman Act by the MillerTydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1957) and the McGuire
Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
'However, some parts of the acts, and generally the non-signer provisions,
have been held unconstitutional in.Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah.
See Note, 31 N.C.L. -Ev. 509 (1953).
"Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
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certain practices by adding "anti-concession" provisions to their fair
trade acts.5
A perplexing problem under state fair trade laws is whether or not
the issuance of trading stamps by retailers who sell fair trade items at
the minimum resale price results in a reduction in price and a consequent
violation of the act. The problem arises in those states having the "anticoncession statutes" as well as in those that do not.
In the states that do not have the "anti-concession" provisions, the
weight of authority in the cases decided thus far seems to be that the
There
giving of trading stamps does not violate the fair trade acts.,
are two reasons generally given for this view: (1) trading stamps,
having a redemption value appropriate to a normal discount for the
payment of cash, are in all respects a cash discount and not a reduction
in price; 7 (2) the stamps are merely a trade promotional scheme and
are similar to other advertising devices or the extension of credit.8
Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

In addition, Nevada has

part of the anti-concession statute prohibiting combination sales, and Wisconsin

has the anti-concession wordage in a statute separate from its Fair Trade Act.
See 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 3008 (1950).
'These provisions generally read as follows: "For the purpose of preventing
evasion of the resale price restrictions imposed in respect of any commodity by
any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this article (except to the
extent authorized by the said contract) :
"(a) The offering or giving of any article of value in connection with the sale of
such commodity;
"(b) The offering or the making of any concession of an kind whatsoever
(whether by the giving of coupons or otherwise) in connection with any such sale;
"(c) The sale or offering for sale of such commodity in combination with any
other commodity, shall be deemed a violation of such resale prices restriction .. .
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-53 (1950) (Emphasis added).
The issue may be raised in two ways: (1) the manufacturer or retailer may
sue the user of the stamps claiming that their use results in a sale below the
minimum price. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177
(1950) ; or (2) the manufacturer may sue an obvious price cutter who asserts as
a defense that the manufacturer's right to an injunction is waived because he has
permitted others to violate his resale price maintenance contracts by giving the
stamps to their customers. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons,
Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956).
'Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d
684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942); Food and Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. App. 2d
228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408,
30 N.E2d 269 (1940) ; Gever v. American Stores Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694
(1956); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939) ; Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954); Benjamin v.
Palan Drug Co., 144 Misc. 879, 88 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 App.
Div. 1036, 92 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1st Dept. 1949); Nechamkin v. Picker, 67 N.Y.S.2d
60 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
7This is the so-called "cash discount" theory. The stamps are said to be a cash
discount, measured by the economic worth to the merchant of the prompt use of
his money and the corresponding reduction in working capital requirements and
the avoidance of the expense of maintaining credit and the inevitable losses from
bad debts. These courts also argue that it is a term of payment, not a price
adjustment. It is a mode of financing, and the "cooperative" feature permits the
accumulation and redemption of stamps issued by any or all of the merchants in a
given area. In a word, the cash discount thus provided measures the value of
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Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., is an illustrative case of both
of the above propositions. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain
the defendant from violating his fair trade contract. Defendant, who
sold his fair-trade products at the minimum prices, gave one trading
stamp for each ten cents of purchases. Each book of 990 stamps
represented $99 in purchases and could be redeemed in merchandise
worth $1.75. The court held that there was no violation of the act,
reasoning that the stamps amounted to a 1.76% cash discount. The
defendant, said the court, could have provided his customers with a
nursery service to care for children while the mother shopped, with
free bus service to and from his store, or he could have extended credit
for 30 or 60 days, and none of these practices would have violated the
act, even though all would benefit the customer. The court emphasized
that the fair trade laws were not designed to prevent all forms of business competition, but only "cut-throat" competition."'1
On the other hand, a contrary view has been taken in other jurisdictions with similar statutory provisions on the grounds that: (1) even
though it may be an advertising scheme, the benefit to the customer is
directly, proportionately and inseparably related to the article purchased
and its price, and amounts to a reduction in price ;"1 (2) the stamps are
actually a quantity discount because they have no value until a book is
filled, and quantity discounts are generally considered as a reduction in
price.Y2
the use of money to the merchant, and makes for economic equality between the
merchant selling for cash and the merchant selling on credit. It does not in any
real sense work an inequality of price within the intendment of the act. WecoProducts Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, supra note 6; Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, supra note 6.
' Gever v. American Stores Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956).
'336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
10 The court also concluded that this practice antedated the fair trade laws by
many years, and that nothing in the act indicates that its provisions were intended
to prevent the practice. Even if the issuance of trading stamps did constitute a
violation of the act, no injunction should be issued, said the court, because the
injury to the plaintiff is very slight, if any, whereas the damage to the defendant
caused by a restraining order might well be substantial and irreparable. Therefore the maxim "de inininis non curat lex" should apply.
"1Bristol-Myers v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950). Actually the
case involved cash register receipts instead of trading stamps, but the court said
there was no distinction between the two and held that they violated the act
because they have a value in themselves and are directly related to price and thus
amount to a price cut regardless of how small. The court did distinguish the cash
receipts and trading stamps from other types of advertising and promotional
"service" plans by saying that the latter have no direct relation to price and are
completely separated and too remote from the pricing element to come within the
statutory prohibition. For a criticism of this point, see Note, 45 CALIF. L. REv.
378 (1957).
12 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956). This case has been criticized on the grounds that it is contrary to
prior Massachusetts decisions and is contrary to the general view that quantity
discounts usually relate to volume sales of one item between one buyer and one
seller and not a voluminous variety of items and more than one buyer and seller.
See Notes, 30 TEmp. L.Q. 205 (1957) ; 21 ALBANY L. REv. 272 (1957).

1958]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

In jurisdictions having "anti-concession" provisions in their acts,
the fate of the trading stamp is almost certain.' 3 The "anti-concession"
statutes were designed to prevent evasion of the fair trade contracts.
They expressly forbid the giving of coupons as a concession to the
customer. Accordingly, the courts of Connecticut and Oregon have
held that the terms of the statute forbid the giving of trading stamps
and preclude a judicial distinction between a legal cash discount and an
illegal price cut.' 4
These decisions obviate almost any argument that the trading stamp
proponents could make in states having the express prohibitions. It
would seem that the only defense available in a suit by a manufacturer
for an injunction would be a showing that the manufacturer had not
been diligent in his efforts to enforce his contracts.' 5 But in a jurisdiction where the question has never been raised, the court should be hesitant in holding that a manufacturer has waived his rights to an injunction because of the conflicting opinions in other jurisdictions.
Since the North Carolina "anti-concession" statute 16 is substantially
identical to those of Connecticut and Oregon, it is believed that if the
question arises in North Carolina, the court will reach a result similar
to that in those states.
RIcHARD R. LEE
Trusts-Statute of Uses-Trusts for Separate Use of
Married Women
Does the fact that a passive trust is for the sole and separate use of
a married woman prevent it from being executed by the Statute of Uses?
This question was raised in Pilkington v. West' and answered by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in the negative. The plaintiff wife had

conveyed land to a trustee to' be held in trust during her lifetime. By the
terms of the trust instrument the property was to be held for her "sole
1See note 5 srupra.
1Mennen Co. v. Katz, CCH TRADE REG. REP'. (1950-1951 Trade Gas.) f 62,734
(Conn. Ct. Corn. Pl. 1950); Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros., CCH TRADE
Rm REP'. (1950-1951 Trade Gas.) f 62,669 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1950), rev'd on~ other
grounds, 192 Ore. 23, 233 P.2d 258 (1951). If the court were allowed to make a
distinction, it might possibly say that the trading stamp is a transaction independent
and separable from the sale of the protected articles, and therefore could not be
a cut in price. This would open the way for the court to make an analogy between
the trading stamps and the cash discount, and possibly decide that they are the
same thing, as the majority of the courts have done in the jurisdictions not having
the "anti-concession" statutes.
13 It is generally held to be a defense to the manufacturer's action if it is shown
that he has not been reasonably diligent in enforcing his fair trade contracts.
See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956).
1

1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-53 (1950).

- 246 N.C. 575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957).

